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Introduction
More than 100 airlines entered the Indian airline industry after World War II (Brimson
1985) and the intense competition precipitated what might reasonably be described as
“destructive competition”. Tata, a diversified industrial group, owned the largest of the
carriers, Air India, and this became Air India International as the Government
nationalised the industry. Eleven of the remaining private sector airlines then were
merged to form Indian Airlines and the scope for competition was removed. Air
India’s role was to serve international routes and Indian Airlines operated domestic
services under the control of the Director General of Civil Aviation and the regulations
set out in the Air Corporation Act (1953). This framework remained unchanged until
the late 1970’s when there was mounting criticism that Indian Airlines was not
promoting tourism and industrial development at the regional level. The Government’s
response in 1981 was to start a third-level, feeder airline, Vayudoot, but aviation
policy was coming under increasing pressure.
With its 12 million passengers a year, the domestic Indian airline market is relatively
small. However, there is potential for the industry to become one of the largest in the
world behind the USA, Europe (in a single market), China and Japan. Key factors to
consider are the sheer size of India, its prospects for economic growth, its
strengthening business and tourism sectors, a more liberal approach to airline
competition, and poor surface transport links. India has the world’s second largest
population in the seventh largest country, it is the fifth biggest economy and it has a
pool of highly trained scientists, engineers and other technicians. In the longer term,
the Indian airline network could have a strong mix of dense traffic routes with
relatively long sectors.
The current population of India is approximately 880 million and the growth rate is 2.1
percent per annum. Bombay, Delhi and Calcutta each has more than 10 million
residents while Madras, Bangalore and Hyderabad have close to 5 million people each.
Another ten cities have more than one million residents. It has been estimated there is a
“middle class” of between 20 and 58 million households able to afford consumer
durables and potentially a target group for the airline industry. What is more, the trend
has been for the proportion of households in the two highest income levels to increase
(Ministry of External Affairs 1996).
When India gained independence in 1948 its economic strategy was based on the
concepts of self-reliance and social equity. The Government assumed control over a
wide range of industries through a process of nationalisation and licencing regulation
while tariffs and import controls were used to erect barriers to external competition.
However, the arguments for adopting the successful growth strategies of the East
Asian economies had become compelling by the 1980’s (Krueger 1995). The
Government of India began to adopt a more outward-looking policy relying on
international markets to provide technology and capital. Foreign exchange controls
have been eased and market forces determine the exchange rate. Liberal and
progressive policies have been adopted to promote competition and exports and the
Government has invited the private sector to participate in the provision of necessary
infrastructure, particularly in the energy, telecommunications and transport sectors. As
a result of these reforms, India has moved away from its dependence on agriculture
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and mining and now trade and services contribute 70 percent to the nation’s gross
domestic product. Throughout the 1980’s, the economy grew by more than 5 percent
per annum (Asian Development Bank).
Though the average per capita income for India is low, the increasing economic
strength of a sizeable group of households with high incomes has raised expectations
of strong growth in airline travel. It has been argued that the demand for airline travel
is strongly elastic with respect to income because travel by air is at an early stage in its
product life cycle. Assuming an elasticity of between 1.56 and 1.75 (Gallagher &
Jenkins 1996), the medium-term growth from this source alone would lie in the range
7.5 to 9 percent per annum. In addition, the Government’s Tourist Action Plan aims to
increase the number of international visitors from 1.6 million to 5 million a year. This
Plan called for an 80 percent increase in capacity in the domestic market.
In other situations where airlines have been deregulated, air fares have tended to fall
and there have been similar expectations in India. Gallagher & Jenkins (1996) argue
that the price elasticity of demand would lie in the range of -2.0 to -2.3, again because
the market is only just beginning to emerge and because there is a latent demand that
has not been catered for in the past. These authors conclude that the effect of
deregulation in reducing fares “Ö may prove to be the most important short-run
determinant in generating new traffic”. The reductions in air fares were assumed to
follow from improvements in aircraft utilisation and from declining costs in a
deregulated environment. The combined impact of higher incomes and lower fares was
predicted to yield traffic growth of 9.7 percent per annum at least until 2001. At that
stage, capacity constraints and a maturing market are expected to reduce the rate of
growth. The Airport Authority of India is planning for growth of 10 percent per annum
in domestic passenger movements through its terminals until 2005 (Bhatura 1996).
Despite these prospects Indian Airlines’ traffic increased at only 0.9 percent per annum
in the period between 1982 and 1996, although the average rate masks widely varying
performance. Up until 1987/88, the carrier’s passenger numbers had been growing at
between 7 and 17 percent per annum, but thereafter traffic began to fall. A major
problem resulted when an Indian Airlines’ A320 crashed in 1990 and the Government
grounded the remainder of the airline’s A320 fleet during a ten-month investigation.
The number of international visitors to India was growing relatively slowly and some
of the blame for this was levelled at Indian Airlines. It had a reputation for lateness, for
cancelling flights and poor customer service and the Government was under pressure
to inject capital into the airline. Vayudoot had not solved the problems of providing
access to tourist destinations.
Even before the problems with the A320 fleet, Indian Airlines was operating with a
high and increasing load factor, reaching a peak of 82 percent in 1988/89. The
argument that Indian Airlines lacked the capacity to cater for the growth in demand
was gaining increasing credibility. Independent assessments estimated that the market
would increase to around 25 million by 1995 if capacity restrictions were overcome
and if services improved in a more competitive market (Louden 1993). This could have
been achieved had growth rates of 10 percent per annum been maintained from the
mid-1980’s. Instead, traffic fell by one-quarter between 1987/88 and 1990/91 and to
maintain the target of 25 million passengers in 1995/96, it would have required an
average annual growth rate of 26 percent from 1990/91.
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At the same time the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank were urging
India to allow the private sector greater scope to compete in areas of the economy
previously reserved for state enterprises. The Government responded in 1989 by
announcing an “open skies” policy under which it would allow air taxi operators to
begin scheduled services in competition with the national carriers. In addition, the
Government stated its intention to privatise Air India and Indian Airlines by placing
them under the Companies Act with subsequent sale in part or in whole. The
Government has continued its reforms and now allows private sector airlines to
operate scheduled services on the main trunk routes. Indian Airlines has been able to
achieve marginal increases in passengers, but the growth has been taken up mostly by
the new airlines. Collectively, the private airlines carried more than 40 percent of the
total passengers in 1995/96 and the growth is beginning to exceed forecast rates for
the first time since the early 1980’s.
However, the changes in policy have not proceeded smoothly. The Government’s
approval for selected operators to begin scheduled jet services in 1992 resulted in raids
on Indian Airlines’ staff. It has been reported that 115 of Indian Airlines’ 450 pilots
resigned in the 15 months to June 1993 (Louden 1993) and the incumbent was forced
to ground its B737-200 fleet for want of crews. The Government responded by trying
to protect its carrier, but the momentum of competition continued amidst growing
criticism of the nation’s aviation policy. The World Tourism Organisation (1994) has
rejected the claim that the Government has introduced an “open skies” policy. Others
have described the industry as “chaotic” (Ballantyne 1996). Despite the promise of a
new emerging market within a liberal competitive regime, the number of passengers is
at least 50 percent below the level it would have been had the growth expectations
been fulfilled. Many of the new entrants have failed and the remaining carriers are
reported to be barely profitable, fares have increased and the Government has reversed
its policy on equity alliances with foreign airlines. There is still a long way to go before
India’s airline industry is able to grow at the rates seen in other Asian economies such
as China, Indonesia and Taiwan.
This paper documents the changes that have occurred in the regulation of the Indian
airline industry in the past decade and assesses outcomes in terms of market growth,
fares and changes in services. Claims that government-imposed costs and low fares
forced on the airlines by the regulator are major contributors to the financial difficulties
in the industry are examined. There is some support for these arguments, but the paper
argues the key shortcoming of the current regulatory approach is the way in which the
airlines are required to meet “community service obligations”. This matter will need to
be addressed for India to derive maximum advantage from aviation reform.
Regulatory Changes - 1986 to 1997
The approach to liberalising competition in the airline industry in India has been
gradual and it is fair to say that policy has lagged behind the market, although this is
hardly a phenomenon confined to India. The same claim has been levelled at the USA
and Australia (Trent 1995, Hooper 1997) and it is a familiar pattern in the developing
country context (Hooper et. al. 1996). Nevertheless, in India the Government
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commenced with minor changes that were immediately under pressure and it so far has
not been able to establish a sustainable regulatory and competitive environment.
In 1986 the tourism sector argued that there was insufficient capacity on some key
routes and the Minister of Tourism and Civil Aviation responded by allowing private
sector airlines to operate as “air taxis”. A condition attached to the licences was that
aircraft had to have at least 15 seats and no more than 50 seats. Furthermore, there
was a requirement to use “expatriate funds” to acquire aircraft and air taxis were not
permitted to plan any departures within 2 hours of an Indian Airlines or a Vayudoot
flight. Though fifteen licences were issued (Mhatre 1994), there was continuing
criticism of the lack of capacity on tourism routes. This led to the Government’s
announcement in 1989 that it was implementing an “open skies” policy according to
which there would be a progressive relaxation of restrictions on the air taxi operators
with eventual approval to provide scheduled services.
Eleven new applications for air taxi licences were submitted to the Director General of
Civil Aviation and, in 1990, five airlines were given approval to commence. Fares
continued to be regulated and the Government retained its controls over foreign
investment in the airline industry. Also, air taxi operators were required to operate an
equal number of flights on routes of less than and greater than 700 kilometres. Air
Asiatic, based in Madras, imported a Boeing 737 to fly between Madras and Bombay,
but it discontinued operations after only five months during which time it made 363
flights and carried 23,437 passengers. The other new entrants mostly operated smaller
turbo-prop aircraft. By 1991 the policy was regarded as a failure (Malik & Malik
1996).
The fatal crash of an Indian Airlines’ A320 aircraft in 1990 was a major setback for the
carrier and for the Government, especially since the carrier’s A320 fleet was grounded
until a lengthy investigation was completed. The loss of a substantial share of the
incumbent’s capacity resulted in an urgent need for the private sector airlines to
expand and there were clear signals that the Government would allow the private
sector airlines to expand and to advertise scheduled services.
The commencement of East West Airlines in February 1992 marked the start of a new
era. This airline was owned by one of India’s largest travel groups and it had a major
impact on the market with its seven B737-200’s and three F27’s. Its entry was assisted
by a pilots’ strike at Indian Airlines and East West carried more than one million
passengers in 1992-93. One of the significant policy developments was that the air
taxis were permitted to obtain up to 40 percent of their equity finance from foreigners.
Jet Airways, also backed by a travel group, took up this option in 1993 with 20
percent funding from Kuwait Airways and 20 percent from Gulf Air. In the same
period, the other significant airlines to introduce jet aircraft were Damania Airways
and ModiLuft. By the end of 1993, 17 operators had been granted air taxi licences and
another 20 had obtained preliminary approval and new entrants were serving 54 routes
(Malik & Malik 1996).
The rapid expansion of the new entrants took traffic away from Indian Airlines and
Vayudoot. Also, Indian Airlines was weakened through the defections of pilots and
engineers to the new carriers while it faced continuing industrial strife. At one point,
Indian Airlines had six of its 10 A310’s unserviceable, and 12 of its 19 B737-200 and
one-third of its A320 aircraft could not be used (Ballantyne 1996). Vayudoot was
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reported to have made a loss of $5 million US in the first five months of 1994 and the
scope of its operations was reduced to the hilly regions of the north-east. This was a
short-term measure and Vayudoot was folded into Indian Airlines in 1994.
The Government responded with a crack-down on the new entrants. Recruitment of
pilots and engineers from Indian Airlines was prohibited, the air taxis were prevented
from publishing their timetables, the requirement that the private sector airlines fly an
equal number of routes above and below 700 kilometres was enforced, and the new
entrants were denied permission to import any aircraft with 120 seats or more (Mhatre
1994). Indian Airlines ceased contracting out surplus engineering capacity to the
private sector airlines and the new entrants have had difficulty getting adequate access
to terminal facilities. The official position was that Mumbai (formerly Bombay) and
Delhi airports were congested and were unable to cope with rapid growth in aircraft
movements (Mhatre1995).
The status of the new entrants was made clearer in 1994 when the Government
repealed the Air Corporation Act (1953) and issued new guidelines for granting
scheduled airline status. The Government maintained that it needed to examine
applications for licences on a case by case basis, but operators had to demonstrate a
sound financial position, to have a minimum fleet of 3 aircraft and to show evidence of
an appropriate maintenance organisation and training facilities. The former requirement
to operate an equal mix of short and long routes was changed to a more explicit
statement about which “social” and other low density routes were important to the
Government.
The new regulations defined three types of routes. The first category was comprised of
all of the main trunk routes. The “social” routes included the remote areas in the
northeast, Jammu and Kashmir and the Andaman Islands, while the third category
covered all of the other non-trunk routes. Each scheduled carrier flying Category I
routes is required to deploy an additional minimum of 10 percent of that capacity (in
terms of available seat kilometres) on Category II routes and 10 percent of the
capacity on these routes is to be operated within those regions that have some of the
least economic fares. In addition, the carriers have to provide a further 50 percent of
their capacity on Category III routes.
The other major policy development in 1994 was the enactment of the Air
Corporations (Transfer of Undertakings and Repeal) Act under which Air India and
Indian Airlines became limited liability companies incorporated under the Companies
Act (1953). In the words of the Director General of Civil Aviation, the industry has
been “demonopolised” (Vakil 1996). Air India’s lack of aircraft capacity and its
declining share of international traffic to and from India prompted the Government to
give Indian Airlines greater access to regional, international routes where its aircraft
were suitable. Though the possibility of merging the two government carriers has been
raised on several occasions, so far this option has been rejected. Also, there has been
no clear commitment to privatisation, a step that would be difficult to take while both
carriers are performing poorly. In the period between 1990/91 and 1993/94, Indian
Airlines incurred a series of losses amounting to more than US$220 million (Director-
General of Civil Aviation).
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The status of liberalisation in India remains uncertain. The Government controls entry
on a case by case basis and its refusal to allow the commencement of a new carrier
jointly owned by Tata Industries and Singapore Airlines has been criticised widely
(Ballantyne 1996). The new liberal policy is based mainly on guidelines that can be
interpreted and changed easily without any forewarning (Malik & Malik 1996). During
1997, for example, the position on foreign equity injections by foreign airlines has been
reversed and Kuwait Airways and Gulf Air have been instructed to divest themselves
of their interests in Jet Airways, now the largest private sector airline. The Government
levies heavy taxes on the airlines, it forces the airlines to cross-subsidise unprofitable
routes, and it keeps the general level of fares down while protecting its own carrier.
Under these difficult and uncertain conditions there has been a remarkably robust
interest by the private sector.
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New Entrant and Incumbent Strategies
The amount of aircraft capacity on offer has increased substantially as a result of the
liberalisation policy, although one analyst has commented that there has been
Öuncontrolled expansion, transforming a monopoly market into a chaotic free-for-all
almost overnight. There are now seven scheduled private airlines, 18 non-scheduled
operators and 27 others waiting in the wings proposing to enter the fray (Ballantyne
1996). Consumers have a wider choice of airlines offering greater reliability and
frequency, increased capacity, improved in-flight service and better passenger
reservation and handling. However, the parlous financial state of the industry casts
doubt on whether the momentum can be sustained.
In developed airline markets, the most successful entry strategy has been to capture
market share with low fares and this requires a low-cost approach. In some respects
the new Indian airlines did minimise their costs, they started with older versions of the
Boeing 737 and they eliminated some training costs by poaching pilots, engineers and
managers from Indian Airlines. There have been limits, though, to how far the low-cost
strategy could be pursued. For example, the new airlines paid as much as five times the
competing salaries in Indian Airlines in order to attract staff (Ballantyne 1996) and, in
any case, the Government’s embargo on further recruitment from Indian Airlines has
put an end to that source of personnel.
The Government regulates fares and the scope to compete with discounts is very
limited. Under these circumstances rivalry among the airlines is confined to service.
The new entrants have been forced to commence with relatively small fleets and then
have been expected to spread their capacity across different classes of routes. East
West Airlines operated two different types of aircraft in order to get a satisfactory
match of aircraft to routes of varying traffic densities, but this proved to be
uneconomic in a small fleet. When NEPC took over Damania Airlines and renamed it
NEPC Skyline, it retained the original NEPC as a feeder airline. Also, NEPC has taken
over the management of UP Air, a regional carrier in the state of Uttar Pradesh. Jet
Airways announced its interest in developing a relationship with a feeder airline, but
the common approach has been to have a single type of aircraft in the fleet.
The option of building up frequency on a route before opening competition on other
fronts has not been available to the new Indian carriers. The alternative has been to
operate with low frequency and a large network. Better service is achieved by
motivating staff with higher pay and better conditions and by using modern aircraft.
The most successful new entrant, Jet Airways, has a fleet of B737-400 aircraft.
Punctuality and reliability are supported by these staffing and fleet strategies, but it
appears that aircraft utilisation is lower in order to establish a good reputation. For
example, Jet Airways describes in its in-flight magazine how it maintains its reliability
and safety during the monsoon period by holding capacity in reserve.
Initially the new Indian carriers leased older versions of the Boeing 737, but many have
been introducing the B737-300, -400 and now the -500 series. When these ownership
costs are coupled with relatively poor utilisation resulting from operating constraints,
the new entrants have not derived any significant advantage from this quarter. Given
the uncertain state of the reform process, all of the new entrants have operated with
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leased aircraft. This has added to the financial costs of entering the industry,
particularly since currency costs have increased as the Indian Rupee has been
decreasing in value.
Access to sufficient capital resources is one of the key requirements for a new airline,
particularly while establishing a place in the market. ModiLuft, Sahara India, and
NEPC all have been backed by large industrial groups Jet Airways is owned by a
sizeable travel group, as was East West. Gulf Air and Kuwait Airlines each owns 20
percent of Jet Airways. Another potential entrant, Tata-SIA, would be owned by the
powerful Tata Industries and Singapore Airlines. The proposal is to introduce 19
aircraft over a five-year period, but the Ministry of Civil Aviation has refused to grant
a licence despite the Ministry of Finance’s urging to approve the joint venture. The
Ministry of Civil Aviation has taken the view that the domestic airline industry has too
much capacity already and that there is no need for the new airline. Also, the
Ministry’s recent embargo on investment by foreign airlines has become a further
obstacle to the Tata SIA venture.
The new entrants lacked adequate terminal facilities and each has invested in its own
security systems and ground handling. Apron congestion at Bombay, New Delhi,
Calcutta and Madras has posed a major problem. The Government now requires the
airlines to park their aircraft overnight at the nearest designated airport rather than at
their operational base and this is claimed to be a constraint on the adoption of hub-and-
spoke network strategies (Vakil 1996). In 1996 the Government has taken steps to
address these problems by adopting a “Tourist Action Plan” according to which it will
upgrade existing airport facilities and build new airports (Mayes 1996). However, it is
surprising the new entrants have not entered into some form of alliance to share some
resources let alone to cooperate in a broader form of marketing alliance to achieve a
more effective coverage of the Indian network with small fleets.
An additional factor affecting airline costs is a 117 percent surcharge on the price of
fuel introduced by the Government during the Gulf War, the proceeds being used to
subsidise energy costs elsewhere in the economy. This increased the price from 60-70
cents US per litre to around $1.60 per litre (Prasad 1996). Although the airlines have
been granted a dispensation to import their own supplies, customs duty and handling
charges bring the costs up to a similar level. Added to this, airport charges are high
and the airlines are required to collect a 15 percent tax levied on the passenger fare,
the Inland Air Travel Tax. Several airlines have had difficulty in paying the tax revenue
to the customs authorities and at least two, ModiLuft and East West, have had their
operations suspended at various times while they were in default.
The difficulties in reducing costs and the inability to compete on the basis of markedly
lower fares prescribe the opportunities for the new airlines. The new entrants in India
have based their strategies more on service and reliability and they have been able to
capture market share, as the incumbent has not been able to supply sufficient capacity
to cope with a growing market. It is not clear that these are sustainable advantages as
Indian Airlines has improved its service. Moreover, Indian Airlines has a much larger
fleet and a more extensive network and its introduction of a frequent flyer plan in 1993
gives it a marketing strength. There are several extenuating circumstances that must be
taken into account in assessing its past performance including having the main burden
of providing services on the social routes. The grounding of its A320 fleet for ten
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months and shortages of pilots and engineers have been major constraints. At the same
time, it has to deal with a large number of entrenched unions seeking to improve their
positions in a changing environment. Salary increases have been approved and the
airline has a strategy to deal with its shortages of pilots.
A major component of Indian Airlines’ strategy is the commencement in March of
1996 of its own low-cost operation, Alliance Air. The aim is to keep overheads to the
minimum and to use the older B737 aircraft from the Indian Airlines fleet. This has
made it possible to recruit former pilots without having to deal with seniority issues
when they re-entered Indian Airlines. Indian Airlines is disposing of any B737’s not
required by Alliance as it reduces the diversity of aircraft in its fleet. At the same time,
the option of merging and privatising Air India and Indian Airlines has been re-
evaluated. The current position of the Government is that both airlines will be kept
separate, but the roles of the two airlines have been changed. Air India is to focus on
long-haul routes while Indian Airlines was granted wider access to regional routes.
Previously, it had operated to other nearby countries in South Asia, but it was granted
access to another 17 international routes stretching from the Middle East to Malaysia.
Furthermore, there is a commitment to carry out joint marketing initiatives including
code-sharing, joint frequent flier programmers and integrated reservations systems. As
was the case with the incumbent carriers in the USA after deregulation, Indian Airlines
is learning how to take advantage of its size.
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Have The Changes Been Successful?
Choice of airline
There have been numerous attempts to establish new airlines, but the first to make a
major impact was East West Airlines. It entered the market at a time when Indian
Airlines had part of its fleet grounded and also suffered from industrial disputes. East
West was able to expand rapidly and was the largest of the new entrants in 1993-94.
Table 1 shows that Jet Airways, with its strategy of targeting the business sector with a
high-quality service, has taken over the position as the largest private sector airline.
M.G. Express entered into marketing and technical agreement with Lufthansa and
renamed itself ModiLuft. It too expanded rapidly on tourist routes and shorter routes
and was the third largest carrier in 1995/96. NEPC was operating as a regional airline
with F27 aircraft and now has taken over Damania, renaming it NEPC Skyline.
Table 1: New entrants
Operator 1993-94 1994-95 1995/96 Share
1995-96
Jet Airways 665,749 1,239,819 1,606,819 30.9%
East West Airlines 1,055,177 1,041,587 941,157 18.1%
ModiLuft 296,933 575,348 858,429 16.5%
Damania Airways 395,514 672,160 690,840 13.3%
NEPC Airlines 78 220,561 456,215 8.8%
Sahara India Airlines 59,574 170,700 380,422 7.3%
Archana Airways 38,596 0.7%
U.P.Airways 13,890 35,609 32,802 0.6%
Others 22,074 23,291 199,420 3.8%
Total 2,508,989 3,979,075 5,204,700 100.0%
Source: Director-General of Civil Aviation, Annual Reports.
The impact the new airlines on service levels has attracted numerous accolades (Vakil
1996, Ballantyne 1996), but a measurable dimension of the approach to service is the
frequency offered on key routes. One of the features of the Indian airline market is the
concentration of traffic on a small number of key routes. Almost two-thirds of the total
domestic passengers handled at India’s airports is confined to Mumbai, Delhi,
Calcutta, Madras and Bangalore and the next five largest airports bring the cumulative
total to 80 percent. In view of this, the weekly frequencies are very low. Indian
Airlines has five scheduled flights each day in each direction on its busiest route,
Mumbai to Delhi. Jet Airways has targeted the densest routes and it has a higher
frequency on this route than Indian Airlines. Table 2 shows Jet Airways has the highest
frequency between Mumbai and Madras and it matches Indian Airlines on two other
routes. On all of the other trunk routes, Indian Airlines dominates.
Table 2: Weekly flights for top ten competitive routes (total both directions) -
1996
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From To Indian
Airlines
Jet
Airways
Sahara Indian
Airlines
NEPC Skyline
Delhi Mumbai 70 82 12
Bangalore Madras 42 15
Bangalore Mumbai 42 28 12 28
Calcutta Delhi 38 28
Madras Mumbai 34 42 12
Bangalore Delhi 28 14 12
Calcutta Madras 28 14
Calcutta Mumbai 28 28 28
Delhi Madras 28 12 7
Bangalore Calcutta 14 14
Sources: Airline timetables - Indian Airlines, Jet Airways, NEPC Skyline and Sahara India Airlines.
Jet Airways’ strategy of targeting the business travel segment has been a key
consideration in its route planning. It has built up its frequency and confined its
network to the densest trunk routes. The other new airlines have spread themselves
more thinly. Table 2 indicates that Sahara Indian Airlines and NEPC Skyline do not
even have return daily flights in many of the densest markets. Table 3 illustrates how
each airline has configured its network to include the busiest airports. Out of the 20
possible direct connections between the five busiest airports, Indian Airlines offered 10
(7.4 percent) out of the total of 136 routes listed in its 1996 schedule. Jet Airways
concentrated on just 7 of these routes, but this was a proportionately higher share of
the 27 routes it served.
Table 3 shows that Jet Airways, more than any of the other carriers, has a network
focusing on connections between the busiest airports. It is the only airline to have more
than half of its routes with both of the connected airports in the top ten in terms of
passenger movements and 93 percent of Jet’s routes have at least one airport in the top
5. This evidence supports the complaint by Indian Airlines that it has the heaviest
burden of serving the lower density routes despite the regulations on network
coverage.
Table 3: Percent of airlines’ routes connecting top 20 airports by airline in 1996
Airline Both Airports In At Least One Airport In Neither
in
Top 5 Top 10 Top 20 Top 5 Top 10 Top 20 Top 20
Indian Airlines 7.4
    [10]
22.8
     [31]
31.6
     [43]
74.3
[101]
77.9
[106]
85.3
[116]
14.7
     [20]
Jet Airways 25.9
     [7]
55.6
     [15]
63.0
     [17]
92.6
     [25]
92.6
      [25]
92.6
     [25]
7.4
      [2]
NEPC Skyline 12.2
     [6]
26.5
     [13]
36.7
    [18]
83.7
     [35]
83.7
      [41]
85.7
     [42]
14.3
      [7]
Sahara 16.0
    [4]
36.0
      [9]
44.0
     [11]
92.0
     [20]
92.0
      [23]
96.0
     [24]
4.0
       [1]
Sources: Director-General of Civil Aviation. Airline timetables - Indian Airlines, Jet Airways, NEPC Skyline and Sahara India
Airlines.   Notes: Number of sectors in brackets. Airports are ranked in terms of passenger movements.
Fares
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In the USA, it has been estimated that deregulation resulted in a 22 percent reduction
in real average air fares between 1978 and 1993 (Morrison & Winston 1995). In
Australia, average air fares declined by almost 20 percent in real terms in the five years
following deregulation (Australian Competition & Consumer Commission 1995).
Moreover, discretionary travellers have been offered a wide range of discounts as the
airlines have learned how to manage a larger portfolio of fares using yield management
systems. In the USA, approximately 37 percent of passengers paid less than the
average fare prior to deregulation and this has increased subsequently to 60 percent
(Morrison & Winston 1995). In Australia, the average fare lies between 30 and 40
percent below the published economy fare on most routes (Australian Competition &
Consumer Commission 1996). It has been the use of these promotional fares that has
been largely responsible for the increase in traffic in competitive markets.
In contrast, liberalisation of competition in India has been accompanied by rises in the
level of fares. Indian Airlines has increased its charges several times in the period
between 1993 and 1995 and the private sector airlines followed suit. In less than three
years, air fares had increased by 40 percent in nominal terms (approximately 20
percent in real terms). There has been a fundamental difference between the situation
in India as it entered a more competitive era and the situation in developed airline
markets. The evidence in the USA was that regulation resulted in higher costs and
when the airlines were able to compete on whatever terms they chose, the emphasis
turned from service competition to price competition. In India, regulated air fares
remain low. It has been claimed that fares are half the level of comparable air services
in Europe even after allowing for differences in operating costs (Dasgupta 1995). If
this is true, there is little scope for reductions in fares on the scale seen elsewhere.
Table 4 provides comparisons of published economy air fares in India with the USA,
Europe and Australia over comparable distances. Though account needs to be taken of
the widespread discounting in developed, competitive markets, the claim that fares are
very low in India does appear to have some basis. Since costs per passenger kilometre
decline with distance travelled, it is not surprising to see that the fares per kilometre
are higher on the shorter routes. However, the differential between the fares in India
and in other countries is highest on short routes, India’s air fares are relatively lowest
in short-haul operation. Note that the average length of the 136 sectors listed in Indian
Airlines’ published schedule is 670 kilometres. The average fare across these sectors
(unweighted by traffic volumes) was 12.5 cents (US) per kilometre in August 1996
with a standard deviation of 2.5 cents per kilometre.
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Table 4: Comparisons of published economy air fares -
India, USA, Europe and Australia ($US 1996 values)
Region Port (1) Port (2) Distance in kms
(point to point)
Fares
$ US
Fares
c/km (US)
India Varanasi Lucknow 236 37.86 16.02
Bangalore Madras 259 40.29 15.53
USA Cleveland Dayton 261 331.44 126.99
Europe Birmingham Edinburgh 251 178.84 71.25
Australia Sydney Canberra 236 115.22 48.81
India Goa Madras 713 85.04 11.92
Ahmedabad Delhi 727 80.38 11.05
USA Detroit St Louis 706 436.38 61.81
Europe Rome Munich 707 388.35 54.93
Australia Sydney Melbourne 707 201.23 28.46
India Madras Mumbai 996 100.75 10.12
Delhi Mumbai 1,084 106.64 9.84
USA Houston Kansas City 1,037 526.98 50.69
Europe Glasgow Frankfurt 1,082 422.03 39.00
Australia Sydney Hobart 1,040 254.10 24.43
India Cochin Delhi 2,001 209.95 10.49
Delhi Trivandrum 2,159 225.18 10.43
USA Detroit San Antonio 1,944 757.26 38.95
Europe Athens Paris 2,102 674.19 32.07
Australia Sydney Cairns 1,970 415.08 21.07
Source: Australian Competition and Consumer Commission (1995) and Indian Airlines’ schedule
(August 1996).
Notes: Fares published by the ACCC have been updated using movements in consumer price
indexes and exchange rates published by the International Monetary Fund.
In the United States, deregulation had its biggest impact on the longer routes as fares
adjusted to bear a closer relationship to costs. Table 5 presents an analysis of actual air
fares in 1988 (expressed in 1996 values), ten years after deregulation, and the fares
that would have been set were the regulated formula to apply (Pickrell 1995). As a
point of comparison, the average of the fares for the Indian sectors in each distance
category is presented. It is well-known that the formula applied by the Civil
Aeronautics Board kept the fares low on the shorter routes. A similar situation
occurred in Australia where it was accepted that fares on short routes needed to be
reduced for the airlines to be competitive with surface transport (Gannon 1982). It is
not surprising to find evidence that air fares on shorter routes in India are low relative
to the costs involved.
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Table 5: Regulated and deregulated fares: USA and India
(Values expressed in cents per available seat kilometre in 1996 US values)
Distance
(kilometres)
Actual US Fare Estimate of US
Regulated Fare
Indian Regulated Fare
Under 463 26 20 13
463 to 925 19 16 13
925 to 1850 15 13 11
1,850 to 2,800 11 12 10
Source: Pickrell (1995) and OECD Main Economic Indicators.
Note: Pickrell reported actual fares and estimated the regulated fare in 1988 in cents per mile.
These values have been expressed in the table in 1996 cents using movements in consumer price
indexes and exchange rates published by the International Monetary Fund and converted to
kilometres.
A simple formula that has been used to calculate regulated air fares in the USA and
Australia includes a flag-fall and a distance component. Though there is no similar
formula published by the authorities in India, a least squares regression analysis of
published economy fares reveals a model conforming to this basic relationship. The
estimated model takes account of reductions on fares for remote routes. Also, distance
is measured on a point-to-point basis whereas there are many airports served via other
airports. A dummy variable accounts for higher charges on indirect routes. The
following result was obtained:
Adjusted R2 = 0.96
Where
FARE = published economy fare in Rupees
DISTANCE = point-to-point distance in kilometres
DIRECT = 1 if indirect service or 0 if direct service
REMOTE = 1 if route is nominated as a “Type III route”, otherwise zero
The formula indicates that fares increase by 3.08 Rupees (9.3 cents US) for every
kilometre travelled. A similar approach applied to 1,000 heavily-trafficked routes in the
USA resulted in a model with fares increasing at a constant rate with distance. A one
percent increase in distance resulted in a 0.38 percent increase in the fare, but a one
percent increase in traffic on the route resulted in a reduction of 0.48 percent
(Morrison & Winston 1995). This indicates the importance of traffic density in the
economics of airline operations, but competition was found to be an additional
moderating factor in the USA. Using the model for Indian air fares, and evaluating this
at the mean distance, it appears that a one percent increase in distance in India results
in a 0.8 percent increase in fares. Given the predominance of short routes in the Indian
Airlines’ network and the higher costs per seat kilometre associated with short-haul
operations, it is not surprising to generate this result. No data were available to test the
importance of traffic volumes on Indian air fares, though the results reported above
suggest it is unlikely this has had a significant influence on the regulated fares.
(DIRECT)*149(DISTANCE)*08.3(REMOTE)*150511FARE
)2.2()0.51()4.2()2.10(
++-=
-
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It appears that the average flag-fall is 510 Rupees ($15.48 US). However, the fare is
increased by 149 Rupees ($4.51 US) when it is necessary to fly via another point and it
is reduced by 150 Rupees ($4.55 US) when the flight is to a destination in the north-
east, Jammu, Kashmir or the Andaman Islands. At the mean distance, these effects
amount to a 5.8 percent increase and a 5.9 percent reduction in fares, respectively.
Jet Airways’ published economy fares range from being the same as Indian Airlines’
prices to 29 percent more on the 26 routes where it competed in 1996 and its average
increase was 4 percent. In comparison, NEPC advertised economy fares that were 10
percent more than Indian Airlines’ prices, ranging between 30 percent less to 80
percent more on the 30 routes where the two airlines were competing head to head. Jet
Airways increased its business class fares by 15 percent early in 1994, but the
differential with Indian Airlines’ business class fares in 1996 was 8 percent. NEPC
charged 10 percent more on average for business class than Indian Airlines. It has been
claimed that the new entrants have greater scope for influencing the level of fares on
routes that were not served previously by Indian Airlines. NEPC advertised 18 routes
in 1996 that were not in the published tariffs for Indian Airlines. The average economy
air fare charged by NEPC on these routes was 15 percent more than the level obtained
from the regression model and the range was from 36 percent below to 77 percent
above. This indicates there is some substance to the claim.
The scope for discounting so far has been limited, but in 1994 Indian Airlines
introduced discounts of up to 10 percent for point-to-point fares and some airlines
were offering a free return trip on selected flights in 1996. Jet Airways says it is not
prepared to discount its fares (Vakil 1996). It is difficult to say whether the lack of
discounting activity is a result of regulatory controls or the lack of rivalry among the
airlines. One commentator, however, has accused the airlines of working together in
“an apparent price-setting cartel” (Ballantyne 1996). The main support for this claim
was the ready acceptance on the part of the new entrants to match Indian Airlines’
substantial price increases. To be fair, though, this might be a reflection of the difficult
economic conditions in the industry and the need to cross-subsidise unprofitable
routes.
Growth in the market
Despite the regulatory changes and the dynamic conditions in the industry, traffic has
grown slowly. Indian Airlines carried 3 million fewer domestic passengers in 1995-96
than it did in 1987-88. The private sector airlines, including scheduled and air taxi
operators, carried 5.2 million passengers in 1995-96, a 43 percent market share. Table
6 shows that traffic levels fell until the air taxi operators were permitted to operate
scheduled services and then the market increased by 40 percent in five years. In
comparison, when Australia deregulated its airline industry in October 1990, the total
number of domestic passengers was around 11 million a year but has since more than
doubled in size. The Indian air travel market has fallen well short of expectations held
for it when the Government first began to respond to criticisms of the policy a decade
ago.
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Table 6: Passenger traffic task 1980 to 1995-96
Year end
March 31
Passengers (millions) IA Market
Share
Change in
Traffic
Indian Airlines Vayudoot New Entrants Total Market % %
1981 4.85 4.85 100.0
1982 5.56 0.02 5.58 99.6 15.1
1983 6.15 0.08 6.23 98.7 11.7
1984 6.82 0.10 6.92 98.6 11.1
1985 7.91 0.20 8.11 97.5 17.1
1986 8.62 0.20 8.82 97.7 8.7
1987 9.18 0.30 9.48 96.8 7.5
1988 9.93 0.40 10.33 96.1 9.1
1989 9.54 0.45 9.99 95.5 -3.3
1990 9.39 0.14 9.53 98.5 -4.6
1991 7.47 0.44 7.91 94.4 -17.0
1992 8.31 0.30 0.03 8.64 96.2 9.3
1993 7.27 0.21 0.38 7.86 92.5 -9.1
1994 7.23 2.51 9.74 74.2 23.9
1995 6.90 3.98 10.88 63.4 11.7
1996 6.93 5.20 12.13 57.1 11.5
Source: Director-General of Civil Aviation, India, and various annual reports.
Note: Data to 1986 in calendar years, thereafter in financial years with year end on 31 March.
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The Industry’s Financial Difficulties
Since the Indian Government allowed private sector airlines to re-enter the industry as
air taxis in 1986, numerous applications have been submitted for approval and a
number of these resulted in the formation of airlines with ambitions to become national
carriers or even major regional, feeder airlines. Of airlines falling into this category,
there have been some notable failures. East West Airlines, Damania and ModiLuft all
managed to capture a significant market share and then have encountered severe
financial problems. There have been reports that the net profits of these carriers was
less than 3 percent of turnover in 1994/95 (Mayes1996) and the new entrants have
been struggling to survive.
East-West became the largest of the new entrants when the Government allowed the
private carriers to operate on a scheduled basis. Its rapid expansion was a contributing
factor in its problems, but having a mixed fleet of aircraft proved to be costly. East
West suffered further problems when one of its aircraft crashed on a training flight and
then it received adverse publicity when one its senior executives was murdered.
However, “mediocre product and loose management” have been cited as the main
reasons for the failure of the airline (Malik & Malik 1996). ModiLuft’s problems
resulted in a bitter public dispute with Lufthansa about the termination of a technical
and management agreement. Again the airline’s difficulties appear to have arisen from
rapid expansion that stretched its capacity and on faulty strategy (Malik & Malik
1996). After moves to attract foreign investment into the ailing carrier came to nothing
and NEPC’s attempt at a take-over failed, ModiLuft ceased business in 1996.
Damania Airlines began in 1993 as a “businessman’s airline” with 3 B737-200 aircraft
and in its three years of operation it carried close to 2 million passengers while
incurring $20 million US in debt. It pushed the barriers of in-flight service and had
aircraft grounded at one stage for flouting a government ban on serving alcohol to
passengers during flights. As its debts mounted, its aircraft spent more time on the
ground, but the main difficulties it faced were in meeting the Government’s
requirements to serve uneconomic routes. In 1995, Damania was taken over by NEPC
and renamed as NEPC Skyline while the original NEPC with its 7 F27 aircraft was
retained as a feeder airline operating on regional routes.
The new entrant presence in the market now is dominated by Jet Airways with
NEPC/NEPC Skyline, Sahara India Airlines, a handful of regional airlines, and a larger
number of air taxi operators making up the remainder. The incumbents also have had
financial problems. Vayudoot’s failure and mounting losses for Indian Airlines have
been discussed above. The picture that emerges across the industry is one of poor
financial health despite favourable conditions in the Indian economy. Analysts have
assessed that the load factor required for an airline to break even in India ranges
between 67 to 74 percent and a small change in load factor results in wide swings in
profitability (Dasgupta 1995, Vakil 1996).
The airlines have complained that the Government’s surcharge on fuel and its inland
passenger tax raise costs unreasonably for a fledgling industry. Further criticism is
levelled at the fares the airlines are constrained to charge (Dasgupta 1995). In 1994,
the cost of fuel was 0.57 cents per available seat kilometre for the US airlines
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(Gallagher 1995). It is not clear what other costs are included in the category of “flight
operations” for Indian Airlines, but these were 38 percent of the airlines’ total
operating costs and amounted to 1.99 cents per seat kilometre in 1994. The least
squares regression model of fares reported above indicates that the price of air travel
increases by 9.3 cents US for every kilometre travelled. In comparison, the costs of
operating a new B737-400 on a route of 700 kilometres in Australia has been
estimated to be approximately 6.8 cents US per available seat kilometre when
expressed in 1996 values (Bureau of Transport & Communications Economics 1994).
Low-cost operators in the USA such as ValuJet and Southwest Airlines are reported
to have costs closer to 4.5 cents per available seat kilometre, but ValuJet had an
average revenue per seat kilometre close to 9.3 cents (1996 values) while Southwest
was earning about three-quarters this rate (Gallagher 1995).
Southwest Airlines, the most consistently profitable airline in the USA, is able to
survive on average prices below those charged in India. What is different is that the
Indian carriers have little scope to practice price discrimination using yield
management systems. This prevents them stimulating growth in the price-sensitive
segments of the market while charging higher fares to business travellers. The market
could become larger and the airlines could use their aircraft capacity better if they were
given greater scope to increase published fares and to use promotional discounts.
Southwest Airlines has developed a strategic position in its markets with its high
frequency and direct flights coupled with a low-cost strategy that maximises the
utilisation of its fleet. The Indian carriers have tended to compete on the basis of
service and they have not taken advantage of operational approaches used by low-cost
carriers in other countries or of the hub-and-spoke systems that favour larger
operators.
The Government has a strategy to upgrade its airports and this will overcome the
physical, infrastructure constraints on the airlines (Bhatura 1996). These problems will
take time to resolve, but constraints imposed by the regulatory system can be
addressed in the short-term. As a measure of the cost to the airlines of the
requirements on them to support community service obligation Indian Airlines claims
to have only 20 routes that are profitable while the losses it incurred on social routes in
1985 was at least $48 million US (Mayes 1996). A key difficulty for all of the airlines
is the requirement to spread capacity across the three different classes of routes.
Damania Airlines’ problems were exacerbated when it was forced to conform to the
Government’s guidelines. East West Airlines operated turboprop aircraft along with its
small fleet of jets and found it had a major problem in managing costs while trading
frequency, load factor and consumer preferences for the jets operated by Indian
Airlines on its social routes. It eventually grounded its F27’s after incurring heavy
engineering, maintenance and training costs. Jet Airways has succeeded by minimising
its exposure to the routes with low traffic densities.
The new entrants face a difficult choice. They can risk punitive measures by not
conforming to the regulations, they can operate a mixed fleet of aircraft with
consequent inefficiencies and reduced flexibility in scheduling and marketing, or they
can associate themselves with feeder airlines. There are signs that the feeder airlines
are developing a capacity to respond and Indian Airlines has formed its own feeder
airline. However, the new airlines have started with larger networks and with lower
frequencies than would be likely under completely free conditions.
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This means that the airlines are not able to exploit economies of traffic density that, in
the USA, continue to be achieved up to 40 million route ton kilometres (Gillen et. al.
1990). Research into economies of traffic density in India would be useful, but it is
likely that these would be fully exploited by the main carriers only on the routes
connecting Delhi, Mumbai, Calcutta, Bangalore and Madras, if at all. Left to
themselves, the airlines have a strong economic incentive to develop their networks in
such a way that they would spread the fixed costs of entering new routes across a
sufficient volume of traffic. The regulations on allocating capacity place severe
constraints on this option.
All of these factors are resulting in lower aircraft and labour productivity than is
achievable in other airline markets. Indian Airlines had a large workforce in 1993,
22,000 employees for its 7.2 million passengers. This represents a labour productivity
result of 350 passengers per employee or 32,500 revenue passenger kilometres per
employee, approximately 40 percent and 20 percent, respectively, of the rates achieved
in the US domestic industry in the same year. The cost per seat kilometre for Indian
Airlines was 5.83 cents and this compares with an average for the US industry in the
same year of 5.03 cents (Gallagher 1995). It has been noted above that fuel costs are
high in India, but maintenance costs also were one-third higher than the average for the
USA on a unit cost basis in 1994 while sales and distribution costs were slightly lower
in India. The higher costs of fuel and maintenance are compensated for by lower wages
in India even accounting for the lower labour productivity.
It seems there is scope for the Indian carriers to exploit their low labour costs and to
be competitive with low fares. However, the Government can improve the prospects
of reducing costs by setting a more stable regulatory environment and by allowing the
airlines greater commercial freedom to develop appropriate strategies for the nation’s
developing market. A fundamental problem is the Government’s position with respect
to the two categories of “social” routes. The low density routes tend to be relatively
short and, as the surface transport system improves, there should be less need to
subsidise them. There is no good reason why such services would need to be
subsidised for tourists. In the USA, there were similar concerns that small communities
would suffer after deregulation but the experience was more frequent, propeller-driven
aircraft replaced the larger jets (Pickrell 1995). The regional airlines have used aircraft
appropriate for the low density markets and have given the small communities frequent
access to hubs where connections can be made to larger carriers.
Undoubtedly there is scope for promoting smaller airlines to deal with the low density
routes in India but there are some significant routes that are not of a short haul nature
(eg Andaman Islands). The Government has drawn particular attention to the most
needy areas as Category II routes. One of the approaches that could be taken is to
provide specific subsidies for airlines operating these routes. This was the approach
taken in the USA with its Essential Air Service programme according to which
communities that could generate fewer than 40 passengers a day in each direction were
eligible for financial support. The EAS programme has been modified on a number of
occasions but will be withdrawn in 1998, 20 years after deregulation. In 1994, 300
communities were listed by the US Department of Transportation as eligible for EAS
assistance but there were only 77 claimants and the cost of the programme was $26.8
million Abbey (1995).
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That the Government of India considers there are some regions that should receive
subsidised air services is not in itself a problem, but the method of achieving this result
is constraining the development of efficient networks and appropriate matching of
aircraft to routes of varying densities. It is difficult for a regulator in low density
markets to determine the optimal fares, aircraft choice and networks (Forsyth 1992). A
better outcome is likely to be achieved by granting the airlines greater freedom to
choose where and how they will operate and the ability to set fares in accordance with
conditions in each market. This will mean that a mechanism must be found to provide
direct subsidies for the non-economic routes. The Government could adopt the view
that the subsidy should continue to come from other airline users and it could achieve
this through some tax on passengers. Though there are some objections to cross-
subsidies of this kind, there is a need for a thorough evaluation of alternatives to the
current regulatory system.
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Concluding Comments
India has joined the growing ranks of nations that allow competition in their domestic
airline markets. However, its cautious approach has placed a premium on the
protection of Indian Airlines and on the continuation of uneconomic services on social
routes. Fares have increased and traffic has grown much more slowly than should have
been expected given economic conditions. The tourism sector was a vocal critic of
protectionist policies but ambitious plans to increase the number of international
visitors requires further expansion in capacity and improvement in standards. India is
capable of developing a large domestic air travel market but the financial problems
faced by the airlines threaten to stall progress.
Though published fares appear to be low in India, airlines in other parts of the world
are able to maintain profits with similar average yields. Unit costs do seem to be higher
in India than in the USA but improved performance would allow the airline industry to
become more profitable. There does seem scope to improve labour productivity in
Indian Airlines, though this is not as important as in other countries because of India’s
low wages and salaries. The serious problems faced by the airlines in matching aircraft
to routes and developing strong networks with relationships between feeder airlines
and trunk carriers is impeded because of the regulatory approach. It would be possible
to devise an alternative system to give the airlines greater commercial freedom while
raising sufficient funds to support a direct subsidy system for the social routes. There is
scope for the performance of India’s airline industry to be improved and there is a need
for a thorough evaluation of alternatives to the current system.
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